The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, 
Every nation that seeks peace faces a common enemy today in global terror. The recent attacks in Mombasa remind us that Africa is on the front lines of the war against terror. All our citizens know the awful price of terror, and we will not rest until we have defeated terrorism in all its forms.
-President George W. Bush Haram as an ideological movement appeals to the impoverished masses exploiting social and religious fault lines in Nigeria. The group receives some training and financial support from external extremist groups to propagate its "focoist" strategy of utilizing urban terrorism to promote its aims and objectives. 6 Boko Haram has become not only a threat to Nigeria, but also to Western interests and the international community as a whole.
The new strategies could be adopted to defeat the insurgency and restore peace to the affected areas. This paper will attempt to address these questions and offer broad policy options that could be applied at local, national, and international levels to confront Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Nigeria. This paper will also explore possible measures the Nigerian government could take to better police its borders, involve local communities in the fight against the group, enlist international support and assistance, and develop a better framework for interagency cooperation and coordination. New strategies to defeat Boko Haram must also enhance the capacity of security forces, reform the criminal justice system, and advance the socio-economic development of the country.
Defining the Threat
Nigeria's internal security challenges have roots in its history, geopolitical structure, ethno-religious composition, and slow socio-economic development.
American Military University scholar Lawrence Cline identified British colonial rule and its forced merger of disparate ethnic groups to create Nigeria as a foundational cause for insecurity in Nigeria. 8 The Nigerian Defence Academy Professor Etham Mijah observed that the structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious, regional, and political composition of Nigeria and the manipulation of such identities for political power is another reason for violence in the country. 9 Northeastern University scholar William
Miles asserted that politicians often create ethnic and religious identities to achieve political advantage. 10 Other observers have attributed recurring violence in the country to economic inequality. 11 33 This is true for Boko Haram which uses individuals, small groups, and autonomous cells to engage in urban terrorism to promote their ideology and win public sympathies through the utility of violence; a key focoist idea. The group employs various methods such as assassination of key individuals, bank robberies, attacks on military convoys, roadside bombings, and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The group also uses suicide bombers to carry out attacks. 34 Boko Haram selects its targets in urban areas but depends on local support and collaboration to carry out attacks. 35 8 Boko Haram's sustained attacks on wide-ranging targets have had enormous impact on Nigeria's economic and social life, especially in northern Nigeria. 36 The bases. 40 The government also established new permanent military units in the two states. 41 Another aspect of the current strategy adopted by the Nigerian government was the formation of the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) in 2007 but which became active in 2012. 42 The focal point consisted of over a dozen security agencies and government departments responsible for the implementation of Nigeria's national security agenda. 43 The NFPT's activities were coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, periodically met to review national security issues. The Nigerian government also 9 established a committee on security in North Eastern Nigeria. Government strategy also identified Nigeria's porous borders as transit routes for the movement of arms and insurgents and the Nigerian government temporary closed the country's northern borders in early 2012. 44 The Nigerian national security strategy focuses on "public safety and national stability" and relies heavily on the use of modern technology for intelligence, surveillance, detection and informatics as the basis for its new counterterrorism strategy and critical infrastructure protection. 45 According to ONSA, the Government strategy's objective is "to exploit advancement in technology to combat terrorism and heinous crimes." 46 The Government strategy also explored legal means to defeat the Boko Haram threat and terrorism in the country as a whole through the passage of the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) in June 2011.
Nigerian former National Security Adviser General Owoye Azazi stated in 2011 that Nigeria's security infrastructure was inadequate to deal with the Boko Haram threat. 47 The national security strategy therefore identified capacity building for security agencies as a key initiative for defeating Boko Haram and preserving national security. 48 Police and military spending increased to one-fifth of total government overlays in 2012. 49 This represents the largest amount Nigeria has ever spent on security. The
Nigerian government also replaced senior leaders in the security services including the 72 The study also observed that Boko Haram's successful operations have been influenced by the influx of arms and illegal aliens through the country's porous borders, the low capacity of Nigeria's security forces, and the heavy-handed approach of same security forces.
There is also evidence to suggest that socio-economic disparities and ineffective prosecution of Boko Haram suspects have complicated the government's efforts.
Integration of Military Power with Soft Power
Some analysts have faulted government's over-reliance on hard power and the security forces alleged heavy-handedness which in their view tends to alienate the public from the fight against Boko Haram. 73 The Nigerian government's declaration of a state of emergency in areas highly affected by the sect's activities gave the police and security forces enormous powers to search without warrants, arrest, detain, and impose restrictions on movements through the enforcement of curfews. These measures were reported by some observers to have contributed to human rights abuses. 74 The security forces' alleged strong arm tactics may be the result of a force in transition from many years of military rule. The security forces' use of excessive force may harm its reputation as one of the true national institutions, especially if such abuses are perceived to be directed at a particular ethnic/religious group in the country.
Employment of heavy-handed tactics could erode public confidence and sympathy for security forces and deny government forces much-needed support to defeat the group.
Use of the military for internal security duties also erodes the effectiveness of the 
Interagency Cooperation
Interagency rivalry and lack of coordination is a common feature of the Nigerian security architecture. Interagency rivalry is often caused by competition for resources, need for visibility, and quest for a favorable public rating of the agency's effectiveness.
The unwieldy number of agencies that make up the NFPT made coordination of its activities difficult despite the centralization of oversight functions on the NSA. This multiplicity of organizations explains why the focal point did not operate more than four years after its establishment in 2007. 75 In a system with deep inter-service rivalry, it is not difficult to understand why some of the agencies worked to undermine and out-do each other. The parading of two different sets of suspects for the same crime by two different security agencies in mid-2012 is illustrative of this general rivalry and lack of cooperation. 76 Government ministries, departments and agencies vested with specific roles must develop a common framework within which they can identify their roles and develop the capabilities needed to perform those roles. Such a framework must address areas of interface such as policy coordination, intelligence sharing, integration of resources, and joint planning and conduct of operations. This common framework 14 should also designate an appropriate hierarchical structure that would foster decisive actions at critical times.
Border Control and Policing
The role of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition in fuelling conflicts and terrorism in Africa has attracted international concern since the mid-1990s in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. 77 The Nigerian government's strategy against Boko
Haram identified the country's porous borders and their use as conduit for the influx of illegal arms. 78 The late Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf admitted the flow of weapons from Niger, Cameroon, and Chad to the group. 79 Recent conflicts spurred by the "Arab Spring" and the spread of violent extremism in the Sahel region have increased the problem of availability of illegal weapons in the hands of terrorists.
Conventional small arms control programs such as embargoes, targeted sanctions, export and import regulations, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have not yielded positive results. 80 The success of such programs is imperiled in Nigeria where about seven million illegal weapons are in the hands of non-state actors and criminal groups 81 due to weak institutions, local arms manufacturing capacity, corruption, and extensive land and maritime borders that are porous and undermanned. 82 Nigeria's 1,500-kilometer northern border with Niger is of particular concern due to prevalence of cross-border armed banditry and the influx of illegal aliens driven by protracted conflicts in neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Libya. 83 Boko Haram is known to have staging areas and temporary bases in the Zinder region of Niger along the border and daily utilizes several crossing points to transit towards Mali and Mauritania to link up with AQIM and other violent extremist groups for training, finances, and weapons. 84 The plan by both countries to jointly patrol the border, which was first discussed in 2008, is yet to materialize. Such bilateral joint border patrol arrangements also exist with the Republic of Benin along Nigeria's western border. 85 The Nigerian government could employ reconnaissance drones to help monitor the borders at a lower human and material cost.
The issue of porous borders is not restricted to Nigeria's land borders. Activities of criminal groups engaged in the lucrative illegal oil bunkering and kidnapping businesses in the Niger Delta area have made the southern parts of the country an attractive destination for illegal arms traffickers. 86 Some of these weapons may have found their way to the northern parts of the country where Boko Haram is prevalent.
There is also a need for the Nigerian government to be able to track, monitor and secure weapons recovered by security forces during kinetic operations Boko Haram. 
Capacity Building of Security Forces
The Nigerian armed forces have taken great strides in terms of capacity building in the last three years. This is particularly true for the Nigerian Army. The army has trained thousands of military and police personnel in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, established a canine-handling section to boost its forensic capabilities, and reorganized units and formations on the frontlines of the fight against Boko Haram in line with the Chief of Army Staff's vision of "transforming the army into a force better able to deal with contemporary challenges." 90 The same cannot be said of many of the other services, particularly the NPF, which suffers from poor training, low morale, obsolete equipment, and inadequate welfare and motivation. 91 The police also lack surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities. 92 Most of the capacity building initiatives in the armed forces and security agencies have targeted only lower ranking personnel with little attention paid to senior leadership development. Over 5,000 lowerranking security personnel were trained in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency between 2010 and 2012. 93 Another 167 junior officers up to the equivalent rank of major were trained in 2012. 94 There is no evidence of coordinated counter terrorism training Boko Haram attacks on prisons while these suspects awaited trial. 102 The speedy completion of trials would allow the prison authorities to move the convicted prisoners to more secure facilities.
Nigeria's Inspector General of Police Muhammad Abubakar attributed the delay in prosecution of suspects to the lack of enabling laws. 103 The Nigerian Senate disagreed and pointed to the Terrorism Prevention Act, which was enacted in 2011, as a recent example of such legislation. 104 Some analysts agree on the existence of appropriate legislation but blame lack of a designated lead agency in the Act for 19 investigation of suspected terrorist crimes. 105 There is also issue of corruption in the judiciary. 106 Criminal justice reforms should focus on eliminating long periods of pre-trial detention, lengthy trials, duplication of prosecutorial functions, and corruption in the judiciary.
Socio-economic Development
Nigeria is sub-Saharan Africa's second largest economy behind South Africa.
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The Economist magazine projects that Nigeria's economy will be sub-Saharan Africa's largest economy in 2015. 108 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates Nigeria's economic growth in 2012 at 6.6 percent. 109 Nigeria is endowed with enormous human and natural resources but more than 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of $1 dollar per day; an estimated 80 percent live on less than $2 per day.
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Official government figures estimates that about 20 million Nigerian youths are unemployed.
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Nigeria is a diverse country with nearly 400 ethnic groups. 112 This social diversity has presented management problems for the Nigeria's political class since independence. 113 Inequitable distribution of power and resources among different regional, ethnic and religious groups has been a source of insecurity in Nigeria.
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Poverty is more endemic in the northern part of the country where geography and http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-has-killed-3-000-people-says-armychief/129809/ (accessed January 11, 2013). 37 Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram," xiii. 38 The government was slow to act against Boko Haram for several reasons. First, government was eager to show commitment to and respect for human rights, freedom of association, and other democratic norms following the country's return to democratic governance after nearly two decades of military rule. Second, the Nigerian government was averse to another bout of negative publicity after the international outrage that followed the military invasion and destruction of the Odi and Zaki Biam communities a few months earlier.
Third, Nigeria's sharp religious fault line is a key factor that shapes Nigeria's political culture. It is often viewed by many analysts as politically inexpedient for the government in power to show any religious inclination towards a particular side. Nigeria's President at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo, being a Christian, must have been influenced by such considerations in view of the approaching 2003 general elections in which he was seeking re-election. President Obasanjo and the ruling party probably courted Muslim votes, especially as the Muslim north was still seething from conceding power after many decades of political dominance. Fourth, government could not legally deploy troops for internal security duties within a state without a written request from the relevant State Governor, who is also the State's Chief Security Officer, clearly stating the inability of the police to cope with the security situation in the state. This was not the case in Borno and Bauchi States which were the two states most affected by the crisis. It is unlikely that the Borno State government in particular would have initiated such a request in 2002 considering the fact that Boko Haram had strong support and even funding from senior government officials in that state.
